Propositions and Properties by Pautz, Adam
                                                                                       Forthcoming in PPR                                
 1 
 







Consider claims of the following kind:    
 
[1]   The proposition that the ball is white represents that the ball 
is white.  
 
[2]   The proposition that the ball is white and the ball is round 
represents that the ball is white and the ball is round.  
 
In his excellent book Propositions, Trenton Merricks supports with great force and 
rigor a theory of propositions. His main theses are: (I) Propositions are abstract 
objects that exist necessarily. (II) They are simple, lacking proper parts and set-
theoretic constituents. The proposition that the ball is white doesn’t have as con-
stituents the ball or the property being white. And even the so-called “complex” 
proposition that the ball is white and the ball is round doesn’t have as constituents 
the proposition that the ball is white and the proposition that the ball is round. (III) 
Finally, all truths like [1] and [2] lack explanation. Call this No Explanation. In 
defending No Explanation Merricks opposes recent work that starts from the intui-
tion that such truths must have an explanation.  
I will make three points. First, I will suggest that Merrick’s No Explanation 
thesis receives additional support from parallels between propositions and proper-
ties. Second, Merricks offers no analysis of representational truths about proposi-
tions like [1] and [2]. But I will suggest that No Explanation is compatible with, 
and indeed fits well with, the idea that such truths do indeed have a kind of analy-
sis, one drawing on the notion of constitutive essence. Third, I will conclude by 
raising a problem about how we manage to bear attitudes to propositions.     
 
1. Propositions and Properties: Some Parallels 
 
At the end of Propositions, Merricks addresses an objection to No Explanation 
(207-214). The objection is that truths about propositions like [1] and [2] intui-
                                               
* For comments on an earlier draft, I thank Brian Cutter, Jeremy Goodman, Jon Litland, 
Bryan Pickel, and Jeff Speaks. I am also indebted members of my 2010 metaphysics semi-
nar at the University of Texas at Austin where I discussed the proposition-property paral-
lels touched on here in §§1-2. Ostertag (2013) briefly reports that Robert Stalnaker has also 
stressed such a parallel (thanks to Ray Buchanan for this reference).  
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tively “cry out for explanation”.1 In fact, this point is the starting point for recent 
work on propositions by Scott Soames and Jeff King, among others. As Merricks 
notes (207), they develop rival views according to which such truths can somehow 
be explained by our cognitive activity.  
Merricks offers helpful responses to the Explanatory Objection. I think he 
might have included yet another response, one drawing on parallels between prop-
ositions and properties.  
To begin with, those who accept [1] and [2] believe in atomic and “complex” 
propositions. And those who believe in atomic and “complex” propositions are 
also likely to believe in basic and “complex” properties. And they are likely to ac-
cept claims about properties like these:   
 
[3]   For any x, x instantiates the property being white (an abstract 
object) on the condition that x is white.  
 
[4]   For any x, x instantiates the property being white and round 
on the condition that x instantiates being white and x instan-
tiates being round (and therefore on the condition that x is 
white and x is round).  
 
Now, just as some have said that truths about propositions like [1] and [2] demand 
explanation, others have said that truths about properties like [3] and [4] demand 
explanation (Lewis 1986a, 190, fn.13; 1986b, 41-42). In fact, there are striking 
parallels between the two issues.  
I think it can be argued that explanations of truths about properties like [3] and 
[4] fail.  
As noted, opponents of Merricks like King and Soames try to somehow ex-
plain truths about propositions like [1] and [2] on the basis of our cognitive activi-
ty. But our cognitive activity certainly cannot explain truths about properties like 
[3] and [4]!  
Those bent on explanation might concede that the instantiation-conditions of 
“basic” properties cannot be explained but insist that the instantiation-conditions of 
“complex” properties can be explained in terms of their “constituents” and “struc-
ture”. So, for instance, maybe [3] cannot be explained, if we pretend that being 
white is a “basic” property – it is just part of the essence of this property to be in-
stantiated by things when they are white. But maybe [4] can be explained by the 
allegedly more basic fact that the property being white and round has the proper-
ties being white and being round “as constituents”, where that means “parts” or 
“members”.  
                                               
1 A different objection to Merricks’s view is that it’s intrinsically implausible that one ab-
stract simple necessarily represents that the ball is white (and its being “true” up there in 
Plato’s heaven necessitates that the ball is white down here in the concrete realm), another 
abstract simple necessarily represents that Napoleon used a stand up desk (and its being 
“true” necessitates that Napoleon used a stand up desk), and so on.   
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This constituent-based explanation of the instantiation-conditions of complex 
properties is very similar to constituent-based explanations of the truth-conditions 
of propositions. Merricks develops a number of criticisms in the case of both 
“atomic” and “complex” propositions (chapter 4; chapter 6, sect. II). For one thing, 
if the propositions A loves B and B loves A have the same “constituents” but differ-
ent truth-conditions, then simply citing their “constituents” isn’t enough to explain 
their truth-conditions. The constituent-based explanation likewise fails for proper-
ties. For instance, if being white and round and being white or round have the 
same constituents but different instantiation-conditions, then citing their constitu-
ents isn’t enough to explain their instantiation-conditions. Other examples illus-
trate the same point, for instance being butane and being isobutane (Lewis 1986b, 
36-38).  
For both basic and “complex” properties, there is arguably no answer to the 
question: what is the account of properties which explains why they paired with 
the specific instantiation-conditions they are paired with? It’s just in their nature. 
“No Explanation” is pretty clearly right for properties.  
This provides Merricks with a new response to the Explanatory Objection to 
his view. For truths about atomic and “complex” propositions like [1] and [2] are 
at least a bit similar to truths about basic and complex properties like [3] and [4]. 
They all concern “the conditions on the world” that must obtain in order for certain 
abstract objects to be “satisfied”.2 So, once you admit that countless truths about 
properties like [3] and [4] cannot be explained, you should somewhat lower your 
credence that similar truths about propositions like [1] and [2] must be explained 
(it’s just a “drop in the bucket” to hold that they also lack explanation). That is, 
you should lower your credence in the Explanatory Objection to Merricks’s No 
Explanation view. Indeed, by considerations of uniformity, you should increase at 
least somewhat your credence in that thesis. Call this the parallel point.  
Now advocates of the Explanatory Objection to Merricks’s view won’t be 
happy with my parallel point. They will say that there is a big difference. Proposi-
tions represent (as do sentences, stories, perceptions, and so on), and they have 
truth-conditions. Properties don’t represent - they just have instantiation-
conditions. And advocates of the Explanatory Objection will say they somehow 
have a priori reason to think that such “representational” truths about propositions 
have an explanation (perhaps one involving agents) but the instantiation-conditions 
of properties don’t.  
But Merricks could say a few things here. First, yes, in some sense, the propo-
sition that the ball is white “represents” that the ball is white. But this way of put-
ting it may exaggerate the difference between the relevant facts about propositions 
and properties. In philosopher-speak, another way of saying that this proposition 
“represents” that the ball is white is by saying that its truth-condition is that the 
                                               
2 Some claim that propositions and properties belong to the same “ontological category” 
and that propositions are just “zero-place properties”. But the point I’m developing only 
requires the weaker claim that truths like [1] and [2] are at least somewhat similar to truths 
like [3] and [4].  
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ball is white.3 And this does look similar to the fact that the property being white 
has as its instantiation-condition that a thing be white. Second, yes, opponents of 
Merricks might insist that they somehow have a priori reason to think truths about 
propositions like [1] and [2] must have an explanation but truths about properties 
like [3] and [4] may lack one. (Maybe because they have a special, discriminating 
intuition that the rest of us don’t share.) But many of us don’t find this at all. Just 
look at [3] and [4] and then look at [1] and [2]. Is it really pre-theoretically clear 
that there is a big difference in the degree to which these truths “cry out for expla-
nation” – in terms of agents or anything else? Finally, suppose that opponents of 
Merricks still answer “yes”: for them at least, there is some a priori reason to ex-
pect that [1] and [2] have an explanation, while this is not true of [3] and [4]. This 
doesn’t affect the parallel point. For this alleged a priori expectation is defeasible. 
And since there is at least some similarity between these truths, and since [3] and 
[4] have no explanation, it’s undeniable that the parallel point provides some de-
feat.  
 
2. Can Notion of a Proposition’s “Representing” be Analyzed?  
 
Consider [1] again:  
 
            [1] The proposition that the ball is white represents that the ball      
                  is white.  
 
As I said, Merricks favors No Explanation: [1] lacks explanation (e. g. in terms of 
the “structure” of the proposition, or our cognitive activity). But I want to suggest 
that this is compatible with a certain kind of analysis of [1].   
As a way of leading up to my proposal, let’s first consider a simple Modal 
Analysis of [1]. On this analysis, “proposition x represents that p” is analyzable as 
“necessarily, proposition x is true iff p”. So [1] is equivalent to  
 
        [N] Necessarily, the proposition that the ball is white is true iff the   
               ball is white 
 
This Modal Analysis fails because “proposition p represents that ____” is hy-
perintensional while “necessarily, proposition p is true iff ____” is not. So, for in-
stance, necessarily, the proposition that the ball is white is true if and only if the 
ball is white and all dogs are dogs. But, contrary to the Modal Analysis, it doesn’t 
represent that the ball is white and all dogs are dogs.  
Now the alternative analysis I want to suggest has the same form as the Modal 
Analysis but appeals to essence instead of necessity. Kit Fine (1995) has argued for 
the importance in metaphysics of the hyperintensional, pre-modal notion “It is in 
                                               
3 Two clarifications: First, here we’re using the notion of “the truth-condition” in a hyperin-
tensional sense: so, for instance, it’s not right to say that this proposition has the truth-
condition the ball is white and all dogs are dogs. Second, I don’t mean to be “reifying” 
truth-conditions.  
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the constitutive (non-derivative) essence of x that ___”. Armed with this notion, we 
might analyze “proposition x represents that p” as “it is in the constitutive essence 
of proposition x that it is true iff p”. So [1] amounts to: 
 
           [E] It is in the constitutive essence of the proposition that the    
                   ball is white that it is true if, and only if the ball is white.4  
 
This Essentialist Analysis avoids the hyperintensionality problem facing the Modal 
Analysis. True, necessarily, the proposition that the ball is white is true if and only 
if the ball is white and all dogs are dogs. But this isn’t something that is true just 
by virtue of the constitutive essence of that proposition. What is true by virtue of 
the constitutive essence of the proposition – a simple abstract object - is just that it 
is true iff the ball is white. So that is what it represents, according to this analysis. 
The same analysis applies to [2]. 
The Essentialist Analysis extends naturally parallel claims about properties 
like [3] and [4]. It’s just part of the constitutive essence of being white that it is 
instantiated by white things, and it’s just part of the constitutive essence of being 
white and round that it’s instantiated by white and round things. Here’s another 
example. Necessarily, the property being round and square is instantiated by 
something iff that thing is triangular and oval. But that’s not its instantiation-
condition. On the Essentialist Analysis, what is true by virtue of the constitutive 
essence of the property being round and square is just that it is instantiated by 
something iff that thing has the property being round and it has the property being 
square. So that’s its instantiation-condition. Such “complex” properties don’t liter-
ally have “constituents”. Rather, the full account of their essences must mention 
other properties.  
The Essentialist Analysis fits well with some things Merricks says and has 
several virtues.  
[I] On the Essentialist Analysis, the representational property representing the 
ball as white is “analyzable” in terms of essence and truth. That is, it is identical 
with the essentialist property being essentially such as to be true iff the ball is 
white. This entails a form of Merrick’s No Explanation thesis. It entails that, when-
ever a proposition has the representational property, this is not grounded in its hav-
ing any other property. For it is identical with the essentialist property; and in gen-
eral a thing’s having such an essentialist property is not grounded in anything else.   
[II] Merricks (p.20) holds that the representational fact [1] explains the truth-
conditional fact [N]. On the Essentialist Analysis, this because [1] is equivalent to 
[E] and [E] explains [N]. In general, essentialist truths explain necessary truths.  
Relatedly, Merricks accepts particular representation-truth explanations. For 
instance, the representational fact [1] can be combined with “the ball is white” to 
explain why the proposition that the ball is white is true. On the Essentialist Anal-
                                               
4 Brian Cutter suggested a slight addition to my analysis [E]: It is in the constitutive es-
sence of the proposition that the ball is white that it is true iff, and because, the ball is 
white. However, I will work with [E] for simplicity.  
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ysis, this is because [1] is equivalent to [E], and [E] can be combined with “the ball 
is white” to explain this.5  
 [III] As noted above, the Essentialist Analysis explains the hyperintensionality 
of “proposition p represents that ___” and the hyperintensionality of “property P 
has as its instantiation condition that ____”. These aren’t brute facts; they flow 
from the hyperintensionality of “It is in the constitutive essence of x that ___”. 
[IV] Intuitively, essentialist claims like [E] are true. The simplest view is 
therefore that representational facts like [1] just are these essentialist facts.  
[V] The Essentialist Analysis applies uniformly to propositions and properties. 
Despite these virtues, I think Merricks would reject the Essentialist Analysis of 
representational facts like [1] and [2], for two reasons. First, he not only accepts No 
Explanation. He also gives no analysis of such facts.6 So for him the representa-
tional properties of propositions (e. g. representing that the ball is white) are not 
only ungrounded in anything more basic (No Explanation); they are also funda-
mental, unanalyzable properties of propositions (and so not analyzable in terms of 
essence and truth), which explain their truth-conditions. Call this No Analysis. Se-
cond, above I said that the Essentialist Analysis is compatible with particular rep-
resentation-truth explanations ([II]). But it is incompatible with another claim 
Merricks makes. He claims that “the predicate ‘is true’ applies to a proposition just 
in case that proposition represent things as being a certain way and things are as 
that proposition represents them as being” (p.20, fn.10). His apparent claim here 
that truth is analyzable in terms of representation is incompatible with claim of 
Essentialist Analysis that representation is analyzable in terms of truth and es-
sence.7  
So Merricks apparently accepts the No Analysis view of propositional repre-
sentation. But I have shown that the Essentialist Analysis is also compatible with 
his No Explanation thesis. I think Merricks might consider rejecting No Analysis 
in favor of the Essentialist Analysis, because I’m not sure he can show that No 
Analysis shares all the virtues of the Essentialist Analysis (especially [III]-[V]).  
To take just one example: the Essentialist Analysis has the virtue [V] of apply-
ing naturally and uniformly to propositions and properties. Intuitively, propositions 
                                               
5 Merricks also holds (186-187) that [1] and [N] don’t entail “there is an x such that x = the 
ball”. The Essentialist Analysis can accommodate this too if we say that [E] likewise 
doesn’t have this entailment.  
6 Merricks claims (21) that the proposition that the ball is white essentially represents that 
the ball is white, but I hope it is obvious that this doesn’t mean he holds that propositional 
representation is itself analyzable in terms of essence and truth as I’ve suggested.  
7 Merricks doesn’t say how to formulate such an analysis in a way consistent with his view 
(189) that the representational properties of propositions aren’t relations to any kind of 
items. One idea would be to offer a disjunctive or “big list” analysis: proposition p is true = 
proposition p has the fundamental non-relational property representing that the ball is 
white and the ball is white or proposition p has the fundamental non-relational property 
representing that Napoleon used a standup desk and Napoleon used a standup desk or . . . 
Another idea is to invoke a primitive and ontologically non-committal higher-order quanti-
fier that allows for quantification into sentence position: proposition p is true = for some s, 
proposition p has the property representing s and s.  
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do have nonfundamental essentialist properties like: being essentially such as to be 
true iff p. Intuitively, properties have similar nonfundamental essentialist proper-
ties: being essentially such as to be instantiated by something iff it is F. They’re 
nonfundamental in that they’re analyzable terms of essence, truth, and instantia-
tion. By contrast, Merricks’s rival No Analysis view doesn’t apply so naturally and 
uniformly to the two cases. For, on the No Analysis view, propositions have dis-
tinct fundamental representational properties (like “representing the ball as 
white”) that are prior to, and explain, their truth-conditions (e. g. [1] is unanalyza-
ble but explains [N]). So the parallel view in the case of properties would be that 
they likewise have distinct fundamental (higher-order) properties that are prior to, 
and explain, their instantiation-conditions.8 Such alleged fundamental properties 
would be distinct from the aforementioned essentialist properties. But here this 
view is very unnatural. (It’s even hard to come up with names of the alleged extra 
fundamental properties of properties. Maybe “encoding that a thing is white”?) If 
properties don’t have such fundamental higher-order properties that explain their 
instantiation-conditions, and there is reason to expect a uniform view, then there is 
some reason to doubt that propositions have such fundamental properties that ex-
plain their truth-conditions.  
 
3. How Do We Bear attitudes to Propositions?  
 
On Merricks’s view, as I view a tomato, I bear the believing relation to the propo-
sition that the tomato is round, a simple abstract object. And I bear this relation to 
countless other propositions. For instance, I bear this relation to the proposition 
that two plus two is four, rather than the proposition that two quus two is four 
(where the quus function is some specific function that yields the same results as 
the plus function for accessible numbers but different results for certain inaccessi-
ble numbers). How is this?  
Merricks doesn’t address this issue. However, I think he is under some pres-
sure to accept two claims.  
First, Grounding Connections. There are countless necessities of the following 
form:  
 
[G] Necessarily, if the non-doxastic facts about a subject are so-
and-so, then those facts ground the fact that the subject bears the 
believing relation to proposition p.  
 
Further, in the actual world at least, whenever a subject believes a proposition, 
this is grounded in some such non-doxastic facts. In short, the doxastic facts are 
grounded in non-doxastic facts and cannot float free from them. Analogy: the nor-
                                               
8 As I said, Merricks favors a general analysis of “proposition x is true” (see my previous 
footnote). Uniformity would require a parallel analysis of “property X is instantiated by y”. 
Perhaps: property X is instantiated by y = property X has fundamental property P1 (“encod-
ing that a thing is white”) and y is white or property X has fundamental property P2 (“en-
coding that a thing is round”) and y is round or . . .  
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mative facts are grounded in the non-normative facts and cannot float free from 
them.   
To illustrate, consider the total non-doxastic facts about me while viewing the 
tomato. They include the first-person fact that the tomato looks clearly round to 
me, the fact that the sentence “Hm, that tomato sure is round” runs though my in-
ner voice, the fact that all my behavioral dispositions are appropriate to the pres-
ence of a round thing, and much else. Is there a “possible world” where all these 
phenomenal-functional facts are the same, and yet I “really” bear the believing re-
lation to the proposition that the tomato is triangular, rather than the proposition 
that the tomato is round? This would have to be a super secret belief: not only 
would it not show up in my overt behavioral dispositions, it wouldn’t even show 
up in my inner experiential life (e. g. my “inner speech”, imagery, etc.)! This 
seems impossible. Indeed, a full description of the non-doxastic phenomenal-
functional facts about me ground the fact that I believe that the tomato is round.  
Note that Grounding Connections only says that doxastic facts are grounded in 
non-doxastic facts. The non-doxastic facts include first-person experiential facts 
and experiences are arguably themselves essentially representational. So Ground-
ing Connections certainly doesn’t require the claim (criticized by Merricks at 
207ff) that all representational facts are grounded in purely non-representational 
facts. 
Now for the second claim Merricks is under pressure to accept: No Analysis. 
That is, there is no true identification of the form   
 
[A] λxλy(subject x believes abstract proposition y) = λxλy(x . . . y) 
 
where the relation named on the right-side is definable in belief-independent (e. g. 
experiential-functional-causal) terms.9 In this sense, the believing relation is a 
primitive relation. Those who hold that in having beliefs we can be related to all 
manner of acausal abstract objects are under especially strong pressure to accept 
this. Just try to even gesture at a toy completion of [A] that explains, for instance, 
how we believe propositions about the plus function and not some quus-like func-
tion.10  
Let the Primitive Grounding View be the conjunction of Grounding Connec-
tions and No Analysis. On this view, then, the believing relation is “primitive”, in 
the sense of No Analysis. Nevertheless, there are countless grounding connections 
of the following form: 
 
                                               
9 For simplicity, I will treat believing as a dyadic relation (but see Merricks p.44, fn.5).  
10 Merricks might think that believing the proposition that p is just being disposed to occur-
rently judge that p. I think that this analysis over-intellectualizes belief and that the idea of 
“occurrently judging” is obscure (especially for non-linguistic subjects). But even if this 
kind of analysis is right, it doesn’t matter. For then the points I make about the believing 
relation – Grounding Connections and No Analysis - apply to the judging relation.   
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[G*] Necessarily, if the non-doxastic facts about a subject are so-
and-so, then those facts ground the fact that the subject bears the 
primitive belief relation to proposition p. 
 
Analogy: followers of G. E. Moore hold that goodness is primitive but that its in-
stantiation is always grounded in the instantiation of “natural” properties.  
So Merricks is under some pressure to accept the Primitive Grounding View of 
belief. But it has three drawbacks.  
 (1) Complexity. On the Primitive Grounding View, there are countless specific 
“grounding laws” of form [G*]. Maybe some can be derived from more general, 
systematic “grounding laws”. But this is not obvious. In any case, the view will 
end up with a swarm of brute “grounding laws” of the G*-variety, which cannot be 
derived from more basic truths (even if they’re knowable a priori). Intuitively, 
they add to the complexity of our theory of the world (just as brute psychophysical 
laws add to the complexity of dualism about experience). In this way, they differ 
from analyses or identifications like [A], which intuitively have the virtue of de-
creasing the complexity of our theory. 
Merricks might respond that we must already accept such complexity else-
where. For instance, whenever some particles together instantiate being arranged 
mountain-wise, then this is grounded their having certain fundamental physical and 
topic-neutral properties, but there is no general analysis of being arranged moun-
tain-wise which explains all such grounding connections. 
However, while I doubt that under Merricks’s view the believing relation ad-
mits of metaphysical analysis, I think it’s more likely that being arranged moun-
tain does (here we can at least begin to specify toy analyses). Further, because of 
my next two points, I think that the Primitive Grounding View is more odd for be-
lieving than for being arranged mountain-wise.  
 (2) Anomalous. In general, grounding obeys a congruence constraint: if a fact 
involves a certain real item, then the facts which ground that fact also involve that 
item. For instance, I bear the friendship relation to Anna, and this is grounded in 
my bearing certain (emotional, behavioral, etc.) relations to Anna. Likewise, if a 
physical object bears the mass-in-grams relation to the number seven, this is be-
cause it bears to the number seven the relation of being mapped into it by the 
unique structure-preserving mapping that accords with the convention that deter-
mines the standard gram. But given the Primitive Grounding View of belief, there 
are countless exceptions – which is anomalous. For the fact that a person stands in 
the believing relation to a proposition is presumably grounded in largely concrete 
facts about the person that are specifiable without mentioning that proposition at 
all: for instance, facts about her behavioral dispositions and experiences.11 
                                               
11 You might think the people in the room number two because John and Jane are in the 
room and no one else is. This would violate congruence because the grounding fact just 
involves John and Jane, and not the number two. But another view (suggested to me by Kit 
Fine) is that the true grounding fact here is instead that there is a one-one correspondence 
between the numbers less than 2 (viz. 0 and 1) and the people in the room, which does in-
volve the number two. Even if there are some more plausible violations of congruence (a 
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(3) Arbitrary. Consider this grounding connection: certain non-doxastic facts 
about me (including facts about my dispositions to use arithmetical vocabulary) 
ground the fact that I bear the believing relation to the proposition that two plus 
two is four, rather than the proposition that two quus two is four.  
Absent some explanation, this grounding connection looks arbitrary. But it’s 
hard to see how Merricks might explain it. If there is an explanation, it must have 
two parts. First, the non-doxastic facts ground the fact that I bear non-doxastic re-
lation R to the plus proposition, and bearing R to a proposition is in turn sufficient 
for believing it. Second, the non-doxastic facts also ground the fact that I don’t 
bear non-doxastic relation R* to the quus proposition, and bearing R* to a proposi-
tion is necessary for believing it. The trouble is that it is very hard to see what R 
and R* might be.  
A final remark. Merricks might respond that the problem of intentionality is a 
problem for anyone who is not a Quinean eliminativist about intentionality. It’s 
even a problem for nominalists who, unlike Merricks, don’t believe in propositions 
(or properties, mathematical objects, functions, etc.), since they still hold that our 
beliefs are somehow about specific concrete things and are true or false depending 
on how those things are. But I’ve suggested that the problem is worse for those 
like Merricks who believe in propositions (and all those other acausal abstracta) 
than it is for those with more austere ontologies, because they are under especially 
strong pressure to accept the Primitive Grounding View of x believes proposition y 
(and x is thinking about existing item y, etc.). And I have raised some unique prob-
lems for this view.   
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possibility I’m open to), my problem in the text still applies: for almost always, grounding 
obeys congruence, and Merricks’s view apparently requires a novel and unusual exception. 
